In late 2004 or early 2005, relations between Prachanda and Baburam Bhattarai resumed.  This is believed to be due to differences of opinion on power-sharing within the party. Bhattarai was dissatisfied with the consolidation of power under Prachanda. At one point, Prachanda Bhattarai was expelled from the party, but was later reinstated.  Later, they reconciled at least some of their differences.   The political scenario after the agreement may seem rather obscure, but it will be wrong to interpret it mechanically. Some "radical" foreigners want to believe that the Maoists are simply using the agreement as a tactic, because such compromises run counter to the spirit of the revolution. However, the truth of Mao`s declaration that the total victory of the revolution will last for hundreds of years must be recognized, and a revolutionary force must be prepared for any eventuality in the "continuous revolution and counter-revolution process", and it cannot rely on formulas. The Nepalese revolutionaries` understanding of the "relationship between the party, the army, the state and the people" is largely based on the fundamental idea of the "right of the masses to self-dispose" (4). Throughout the history of the war, they have built themselves on coordination with different "autonomous" movements, even if they were not often aware of them. There have been cases where they have been shaken, but they have controlled themselves well.
Therefore, the identification of the militaristic aspect of the war in Nepal reduces its history, experience and logic to zero, to mere formulas derived from "teachings" and "preaching", even generalizations of past experiences. This amounts to war of men and sacrificing goals in themselves, against their function of "liberating the creativity and energy of the people and making them the new leaders with more responsibility" (5). The text of the agreement shows the willingness of democrats - both parliamentarians and revolutionaries - to reconsider their respective strategies in order to save the coordination achieved so far. While it is difficult to predict all the effects of this agreement, conflicting attempts are clearly reflected in the text. The reluctance of moderates to go beyond the constitutional monarchy is reflected in the criticism of the "autocratic monarchy" rather than the monarchy itself. On the other hand, the agreement also speaks of absolute democracy. Only time will determine where this Cartesian union of the spirits of "democracy" will lead. But the major advances are the redistribution of the issue of the "constituent assembly" to the agenda of the "unified" popular movement, with the question of sweeping away the "royalty" of the Nepalese armed forces (but the latter is not clearly exposed) (3).
The independent statements of the revolutionary leaders suggest that they are ready to reconsider their attitude towards the "constitutional monarchy" when a constituent assembly is formed.